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Assignability of Legal Malpractice
Claims
This Note analyzes whether a legal malpractice claim can be as-
signed to a party outside the attorney-client relationship, an issue
not yet addressed by the Alaska courts. The Note discusses the
trends in assignability of causes of action in general and in privity
and suggests that, increasingly, cases are being litigated by parties
outside the relationship giving rise to the suit. The Note then looks
to other jurisdictions and finds that most states do not allow such
as assignment based on the public policy grounds of the personal
nature of the relationship between attorneys and clients and the
desire to avoid trafficking in legal malpractice claims. The Note
concludes that a case-by-case analysis will be necessary to deter-
mine if a specific legal malpractice claim can be assigned in
Alaska.
I. INTRODUCTION
May a legal malpractice claim be assigned to a party outside
the attorney-client relationship? The Alaska Supreme Court de-
clined to answer this question in the case of Juneau Factors, Inc. v.
Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin.' Therefore, practi-
tioners will have to look to the law of other jurisdictions and to the
proceedings in Juneau Factors for guidance.
The proceedings that led to the assignment in Juneau Factors
began with a suit brought by Spaulding Beach Condominium As-
sociation ("the Association") against Spaulding Beach Joint Ven-
tures ("Joint Ventures") alleging defects in condominiums con-
structed by Joint Ventures.2 The law firm of Hughes Thorsness
Gantz Powell & Brundin ("Hughes Thorsness")3 represented the
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1. No. 1JU-92-1799 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. filed Sept. 30,
1992).
2. See Amended Complaint at 3, Spaulding Beach Ass'n v. Van Dort, No.
1JU-87-678 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. filed Dec. 22, 1989).
3. Renamed "Hughes, Thorsness, Powell, Huddleston & Bauman, L.L.C." in
1996. Heard on the Street, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Sept. 5, 1996, at D1.
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Association in the suit.' As part of a settlement agreement, the
Association assigned any legal malpractice claim it may have had
against Hughes Thorsness to the defendant, Joint Ventures Joint
Ventures, who now owned any malpractice claim against Hughes
Thorsness, assigned its potential cause of action to Juneau Factors,
Inc. ("Juneau Factors"), 6 a corporation whose activities include
purchasing and collecting upon causes of action or "factoring"
causes of action. Juneau Factors appears to have been created
solely for the purpose of accepting the assignment of any cause of
action against Hughes Thorsness arising out of the Associa-
tion/Joint Ventures suit by the same two individuals who owned
the defendant corporation, Joint Ventures.8
Juneau Factors, assignee, then brought a malpractice action
against Hughes Thorsness and one of its attorneys, John Frank, for
legal malpractice based on a theory of "lost settlement opportu-
nity."' Juneau Factors's complaint stated that in the defective con-
struction suit brought by the Association, the defendant Joint Ven-
tures offered to settle all claims for $415,000.0 Before this offer
was accepted, the trial court granted Joint Ventures's motion for
summary judgment, thereby dismissing certain claims.1 Subse-
quently, Joint Ventures withdrew its offer of $415,000 and later
agreed to pay the Association only $190,000, saving Joint Ventures
about $225,000.12
Juneau Factors, suing under an assignment from the defen-
dant who just saved $225,000 on the price of settlement, claimed
that the defendant should not have just saved $225,000 on the price
of settlement. Juneau Factors claimed that the Association's at-
torney, John Frank, had agreed to ask the trial court to defer ruling
on the summary judgment motion while settlement negotiations
were taking place but had actually failed to ask for such a defer-
ral.u Juneau Factors claimed that this failure resulted in the court
4. See Amended Complaint at 6, Spaulding Beach Ass'n (No. 1JU-87-678
CI).
5. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: In-
validity of Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claim, Ex. D, Juneau Factors (No.
1JU-92-1799 CI) (containing settlement agreement in Spaulding Beach Ass'n (No.
1JU-87-678 CI)).
6. See id., Ex. F at 1.
7. See id.
8. See id., Ex. G at 5.
9. Complaint at 4, Juneau Factors (No. 1JU-92-1799 CI).
10. See id. at 3.
11. The court dismissed the Association's claims for damages arising from a
fire. See id.
12. See id. at 4.
13. See Complaint at 3, Juneau Factors (No. 1JU-92-1799 CI).
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ruling against the Association before the Association had an op-
portunity to accept the $415,000 offer, thus forcing it to settle for
only $190,000.14
In the legal malpractice action, Hughes Thorsness moved for
summary judgment on the ground that public policy prohibits the
assignment of legal malpractice claims. The superior court de-
nied the motion, and the Alaska Supreme Court denied Hughes
Thorsness's petition for review. 6 Hughes Thorsness then moved
for the superior court to reconsider its ruling on the summary
judgment motion.7 However, the case was settled before the court
had an opportunity to rule on the motion for reconsideration.
The Association's legal malpractice claim was worth approxi-
mately $225,000 in lost settlement opportunity. Had the Associa-
tion filed the claim itself, few would have objected, since it was
merely trying to recover its own loss. However, when it assigned
its claim to Joint Ventures - who suffered no loss from the alleged
malpractice, but in fact saved $225,000 on the price of settlement 8
- the assignment is a bit more controversial. Some jurisdictions
would object on public policy grounds. Others might view the as-
signment as a useful settlement tool. This Note examines the con-
troversy and details the approaches courts have employed in de-
termining whether legal malpractice claims are assignable.
Part II of this Note presents the common law approach to is-
sues of assignability of causes of action, concluding that in the
malpractice context, assignability is typically decided on public
policy grounds. Part III explains the public policy arguments ad-
vanced by jurisdictions other than Alaska, and recommends that
the Alaska Supreme Court, when faced with the issue, should not
adopt the majority's position as a per se rule against assignability.
Rather, the Alaska Supreme Court should recognize public policy
concerns on both sides of the issue and determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the public policy concerns against assignment
are present. Part IV applies Alaska law to the Juneau Factors case
and suggests that the public policy concerns counseling against as-
signment predominate and thus make the assignments void.
14. See id. at 3-4.
15. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: In-
validity of Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claim at 1, Juneau Factors (No. 1JU-
92-1799 CI).
16. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at 1-
2, Juneau Factors (No. 1JU-92-1799 CI).
17. See id. at 5.
18. Joint Ventures's subsequent assignment of the claim to Juneau Factors did
little to alleviate the apparent inequity, as the shareholders of Juneau Factors are
the same two people who own Joint Ventures.
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II. THE LAW OF ASSIGNMENT
An assignment is "[t]he act of transferring to another all or
part of one's property, interest, or rights."19 While the early com-
mon law rejected all assignments of a cause of action," modern
courts allow the assignment of causes of action that survive the
death of a party.21 Even if a cause of action survives, however, a
court may reject an assignment on public policy grounds.' This
public policy restriction on assignability has been the primarX
source of debate over the assignability of legal malpractice claims.
A. The Common Law of Assignment
Under early common law, a cause of action could not be as-
signed; "no one could purchase another's right to a suit, either in
whole or in part."'24 Two reasons for this rule were generally given.
Some courts forbade assignment of a cause of action because "the
assignee was not in privity with the person against whom the obli-
gation existed."'  Other courts based their decisions disallowing
assignments on the public policy concern that courts should not be
used to enforce any action that hinted at champerty and mainte-
nance.2
Today, the original rule of nonassignability has been almost
fully abandoned, both by judicial decision and by statute. The as-
signability of causes of action is now the rule, and nonassignability
the exception.' The general test of assignability is whether or not
the cause of action will survive; if the cause of action survives, it is
assignable.' Survivability, in turn, often hinges on the nature of
the claim, with contractual claims usually surviving and claims in
19. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990).
20. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 27 (1963).
21. See id. §§ 29-30.
22. See id. § 30.
23. See infra Part III.
24. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 27 (1963).
25. Id. "In its broadest sense, 'privity' is defined ... as such an identification
of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). The decline of the privity rule
has made this rationale obsolete. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal.
1958).
26. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 27 (1963). Champerty is a "bargain be-
tween a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's
claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds; it is one type of
'maintenance,' the more general term which refers to maintaining, supporting, or
promoting another person's litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 231 (6th ed.
1990).
27. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 29.
28. See id. § 30.
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the nature of a personal tort not surviving. As a result,
"[p]ractically the only [causes of] action which are not assignable
are those for torts for personal injuries and for wrongs done to the
person, the reputation, or the feelings of the injured party, and
those for breach of contracts of a purely personal nature, such as
promises of marriage."29 Survivability is not the only factor, how-
ever.0 As noted above, if the assignment of a survivable cause of
action is contrary to public policy, it will not be enforced. 1
B. Alaska's Law of Assignment
Alaska's law of assignment closely resembles the evolution of
the common law in this area. An early decision based assignment
on the survivability of, and nature of, the claim to be assigned?2 In
Ishmael v. City Electric,33 the court first acknowledged that early
doctrine dictated that a cause of action arising in tort was not as-
signable in law or equity on the grounds that tort causes of action
did not survive?' Next, the court explained how early English stat-
utes modified the rule of nonassignability of tort actions to allow
the survival of those tort actions involving damage to real or per-
sonal property, but not causes of action for personal injuries. 5 The
court concluded that this evolution served to remove restrictions
on assignability of tort causes of action for damage to real or per-
sonal property, but since no statute provided for the survivability
for tort causes of action for personal injury, such causes of action
were still not assignable. 6
Alaska statutes now provide that all causes of action except
defamation survive.37  Following the reasoning in Ishmael, one
might expect that all causes of action except defamation are now
assignable, and that the inquiry ends here. Such is not the case,
however. Recall that the common law provides that if the assign-
ment of a survivable cause of action is contrary to public policy, it
will not be enforced*s This public policy exception is alive and
well in Alaska, as evidenced by the case of Croxton v. Crowley
29. Id. §29.
30. See id. § 30.
31. See id.; see also infra Part III.
32. See Ishmael v. City Electric, 91 F. Supp. 688, 689-90 (D. Alaska 1950)
(applying Alaska law).
33. 91 F. Supp. at 689-90.
34. See id. at 689.
35. See id,
36. See id.
37. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.570 (Michie 1996).
38. See supra notes 26 & 31 and accompanying text.
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Maritime Corp.39
Croxton involved the reassignment of a cause of action for
wrongful death from an employer to the deceased employee's es-
tate. Ruth Croxton was killed in an airplane crash while working
for Puget Sound Tug and Barge Co. ("PST & B"), a wholly owned
subsidiary of Crowley Maritime Corporation ("Crowley").4' Be-
cause Croxton died without dependents, her employer, PST & B,
was required to deposit $10,000 into a second injury fund.42 This
payment operated as an assignment to PST & B of any wrongful
death action her estate may have had against third parties such as
Crowley.43 Croxton's estate attempted to bring a wrongful death
suit against Crowley after PST & B assigned back to the estate its
right to bring the wrongful death suit." The trial court found the
reassignment invalid and dismissed the suit.45
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
reassignment was permissible because it did not violate public
policy.46 The court began its analysis by noting that Ishmael held
that tort actions for personal injuries are not assignable because
they do not survive. Noting that all causes of action other than
defamation now survive in Alaska, the court focused its discussion
on other jurisdictions that based their assignability decisions on
public policy, thus suggesting that it did not consider survivability a
determinative test for assignability.'
Turning to the public policy concerns, the court explained that
some courts did not allow causes of action for personal injuries to
be assigned because they "'felt that unscrupulous people would
purchase causes of action and thereby traffic in lawsuits for pain
and suffering.' 49 The court found that while "this reason may be
sensible in other situations," it didn't make much sense in the case
at bar where the suit was reassigned back to the estate of the de-
ceased employee who would have had the right to bring it in the
first place but for the assignment by operation of law under the
39. 758 P.2d 97, 98 (Alaska 1988).
40. See id. at 98.
41. See ic at 97.
42. See id (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.040(c) (Michie 1996)).
43. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(c)).
44. See icL at 98. Had Alaska Statutes § 23.30.015(c) not been in operation,
any wrongful death suit would have belonged to the estate, and no assignment
back to the estate would have been necessary.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 99.
47. See id. at 98, 99 n.2.
48. See id. at 99 & n.2.
49. Id. at 99 (quoting Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 498
(Ariz. App. 1966) (cite omitted)).
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workers' compensation regime." The court found the reassign-
ment to be "considerably less offensive to us than when an unre-
lated third party purchases the rights to such a cause of action."51
The court concluded that the main purposes for the general rule of
non-assignability of claims for personal injury, "'to prevent un-
scrupulous strangers to an occurrence from preying on the de-
prived circumstances of an injured person, and to prohibit cham-
perty, simply have no applicability where the assignment is to the
injured person himself."'
C. The Law of Assignment Applied to Legal Malpractice
Many courts, when considering whether a cause of action for
legal malpractice should be assignable, struggle with the vestiges of
survivability rules and their rationale when trying to resolve the is-
sue. Recall that survivability often hinges on the nature of the
claim, with contractual claims usually surviving and claims in the
nature of a personal tort not surviving.' Some courts find that le-
gal malpractice is more like a personal tort and deny assignability.
Other courts find that legal malpractice is more like a contractual
claim and allow assignability.
Many courts, however, recognize that legal malpractice ac-
tions involve both tort and contract principles, and therefore to
base an assignability decision on the nature of the claim would not
make much sense. Like any negligence-based tort, to recover for
legal malpractice alaintiff must prove duty, breach, proximate
cause and damages. Yet the attorney's duty is often based on the
contractual relationship between attorney and client.5 Courts,
recognizing this conflict between tort and contract, are required to
turn to public policy to determine whether causes of action for le-
gal malpractice should be assigned.
The way Alaska courts perceive the nature of the claim is not
likely to help determine the question of assignability, either. The
Alaska Supreme Court has categorized legal malpractice as a sub-
set of professional malpractice, which in turn has been classified as
a hybrid of tort and contract law. 6 In addition, the supreme court
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Trans., 618 F.2d 1037, 1048 (4th Cir.
1980) (footnote omitted)).
53. See supra Part II.A.
54. See, e.g., Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976); Fiddler v. Hobbs, 475 N.E.2d 1172, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
55. See, e.g., McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662, 665-66 (D.S.D. 1968);
Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskenazi, 394 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
56. See Breck v. Moore, 910 P.2d 599, 603 (Alaska 1996).
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has charged courts "'[to] avoid applications of the law which lead
to different substantive results based upon distinctions having their
source solely in the niceties of pleading and not in the underlying
realities.""' Exercising that charge, the Alaska Supreme Court has
itself applied statutes of limitations based on contract law,58 and
theories of negligence based on tort law, to professional malprac-
tice cases. 9 Therefore, it is unlikely that the Alaska Supreme
Court will rely on the difficult contract/tort distinction to deter-
mine assignability. The court will thus need to consider questions
of public policy.
The public policy concerns at issue in the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim are outlined in the following section. A majority
of courts that have dealt with this issue have accepted the public
policy arguments against assignment." A minority of courts have
rejected these arguments in favor of the public policy concerns that
counsel in favor of assignment." The Alaska Supreme Court's
careful evaluation of public policy in Croxton suggests that the
court will honor Alaska's preference for the assignability of claims
and invoke the policies against assignment only in cases where they
truly apply.
III. PUBLIC POLICY
Common law provided that if the assignment of a survivable
cause of action is contrary to public policy, it will not be enforced.62
The public policy arguments have proven dispositive in a number
of jurisdictions.
A. Jurisdictions other than Alaska
Jurisdictions disagree about whether legal malpractice claims
should be assignable. The majority of states that have dealt with
the issue have ruled that such assignments should not be allowed.
57. Jones v. Wadsv~orth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Higa v.
Mirikitani, 517"P.2d 1, 4 (Hawaii 1973)).
58. See Lee Houston & Assocs. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991)
(professional malpractice involving economic loss); Wadsworth, 791 P.2d at 1015
(legal malpractice due to breach of an express promise). For an argument that
the nature of a professional malpractice claim is more like a tort than a contract
action, see Scott Lawrence Altes, Note, The Statute of Limitations for Professional
Malpractice in Alaska After Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd. v. Racine, 9 ALASKA
L. REv. 41 (1992).
59. See Belland v. O.K. Lumber Co., 797 P.2d 638, 640 (Alaska 1990) (citing
Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173 n.4 (Alaska 1983)).
60. See infra Part III.A.1.
61. See infra Part III.A.2.
62 See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 30 (1963).
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A handful of states, however, have upheld assignability.
1. Arguments Against Assignment. The jurisdictions that
have barred assignment of legal malpractice claims are Arizona, 3
California,: Colorado,65 Connecticut, Florida, 67 Illinois 6 Indiana,6 9
Kansas,70  Kentucky'7  Michigan, 72  Minnesota,73  Missouri,74
Nebraska,75 Nevada,76 New Jersey,' Tennessee 7 and Texas.
Public policy concerns are key factors for these jurisdictions. The
leading case, from a California court of appeals, is Goodley v.
Wank & Wank, Inc.60 In Goodley, the law firm of Wank & Wank
negligently advised its client, Eleanor Katz, during her divorce
proceeding." The firm told Mrs. Katz that she need not safeguard
her husband's life insurance policies by bringing them into the firm
63. See Schroeder v. Hudgins, 690 P.2d 114, 118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
64. See Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639-41 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990); Jackson v. Rogers & Wells, 258 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989); Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
65. See Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492,495 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
66. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 709 F.
Supp. 44, 50 n.7 (D. Conn. 1989) (expressing the court's belief that the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court would bar assignment of legal malpractice claims).
67. See Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
68. See Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8 (Il. App. Ct. 1980).
69. See Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991).
70. See Bank IV Wichita, Nat'l Ass'n v. Am, Mullins, Unruh, Kuhn & Wilson,
827 P.2d 758,765 (Kan. 1992).
71. See Coffey v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1988).
72. See Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 303 n.15 (Mich. 1991)
(stating that Michigan Court of Appeals had found legal malpractice claims non-
assignable); Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736,738-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
73. See Wagener v. McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
74. See Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 583 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (applying Mis-
souri law).
75. See Earth Science Lab., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.C., 523 N.W.2d 254,
256-57 (Neb. 1994).
76. See Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966 (Nev. 1982).
77. See Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Samuel H. Bullock, P.C., 925 F. Supp. 252,258
(D.N.J. 1996) (anticipating New Jersey law).
78. See Can Do, Inc. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan and Successor Plans v.
Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith, 922 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1996).
79. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.
1994).
80. 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
81. See id. at 83.
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or by obtaining a court order to protect them from change.2
Subsequently, Mrs. Katz's husband found the policies and canceled
them. After her husband died, Mrs. Katz assigned her
malpractice claim against Wank & Wank to Goodley.' The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order
granting the defendant attorney's summary judgment motion on
the ground that legal malpractice actions may not be assigned for
public policy reasons." The court's reasoning is contained in the
following oft-quoted passage:
It is the unique quality of legal services, the personal nature of
the attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the at-
torney-client relationship that invoke public policy considera-
tions in our conclusion that malpractice claims should not be
subject to assignment. The assignment of such claims could rele-
gate the legal malpractice action to the market place and convert
it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic
bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the
attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty,
and who have never had any prior connection with the assignor
or his rights. The commercial aspect of assignability of choses in
action arising out of legal malpractice is rife with probabilities
that could only debase the legal profession. The almost certain
end result of merchandizing [sic] such causes of action is the lu-
crative business of factoring malpractice claims which would en-
courage unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal pro-
fession, generate an increase in legal malpractice litigation,
promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves
against strangers. The endless complications and litigious intri-
cacies arising out of such commercial activities would place an
undue burden on not only the legal profession but the already
overburdened judicial system, restrict the availability of compe-
tent legal services, embarrass the attorney-client relationship
and imperil the sanctity of the highly confidential and fiduciary
relationship existing between attorney and client."
The following discussion shows how other courts have adopted the
reasoning in Goodley and applied it to varying factual situations.
a. The Personal Nature of Legal Services and the Attorney-
Client Relationship. The Illinois Court of Appeals, in Christison v.
Jones,7 focused on the nature of the attorney-client relationship in
denying the assignability of legal malpractice claims. Christison, a
trustee in bankruptcy, claimed ownership of any cause of action
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 83, 88.
86. Id. at 87.
87. 405 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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the bankrupt might have against his attorney, Jones." Jones had
allegedly been negligent in his representation of the bankrupt prior
to the bankruptcy proceedings." The court ruled that the legal
malpractice claim was not assignable to Christison based on the
personal nature of the relationship between attorney and client.90
The court explained that the relationship between an attorney and
his client is fiduciary, and that the attorney owes his client the
"utmost degree of fidelity, honesty and good faith."91 This highly
personal relationship is one that should be jealously honored and
guarded by the attorney.9 One way that this relationship is
guarded is by requiring the client's consent before delegating the
performance of legal services to another attorney.93 Quoting the
public policy rationale in Goodley, the court concluded that it
would be inappropriate for the client to assign the cause of action
against the attorney to another party.94
In holding that the attorney-client relationship is of a personal
nature, courts have refused to look at the particular relationship in
the groceeding at bar. In Moorhouse v. Ambassador Insurance
Co., the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that such an examina-
tion would be unacceptable and lead to "the impossible task of dis-
secting the closeness of an attorney-client relationship in evaluat-
ing the validity of every assignment of a cause of action for legal
malpractice."9
b. Preservation of the Attorney-Client Privilege. Kracht v.
Perrin Gartland & Doyle" stands for the proposition that when a
legal malpractice claim is involuntarily assigned to a third party,
the attorney-client privilege is not waived unless by express
consent of the assignor." In that case, Kracht had filed suit against
Hogue, who was represented by attorneys Perrin, Gartland and
Doyle.99 Hogue failed to respond adequately to some discovery
requests made by Kracht, resulting in summary judgment against
88. See id. at 8.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 10-12.
91. Id. at 10.
92. See id. at 10-11.
93. See id. at 11 (citing Cornelius v. Wash., 1 Ill. 98, 100 (1825)); see also
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83,86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
94. See Chrlstison, 405 N.E.2d at 11-12.
95. 383 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
96. Id. at 221.
97. 268 Cal. Rptr. 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 638.
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Hogue.'0° Kracht contended that but for the negligence of Hogue's
attorneys, summary judgment would not have been entered in her
favor.'1 She obtained a court order compelling Hogue to assign
the causes of action Hogue held against his attorneys to her.'02
Because the client, Hogue, had not brought the suit, the attorney-
client privilege was not waived, and the attorneys' defense would
be bound by their confidential relationship with Hogue." 3 The
court ruled against the assignment of the claim, stating that such an
involuntary assignment would unfairly prejudice the attorneys if
they were not allowed to use privileged information in their
defense or would unfairly prejudice the client if he were forced to
waive the privilege.' 4
c. Potential for Commercialization and an Increase in the
Number of Claims. The court in Goodley v. Wank & Wank"' held
that the assignment of legal malpractice claims was contrary to
public policy because it would relegate such an action to the
marketplace and convert it into a commodity to be exploited by
profit-seeking bidders who had never established a professional
relationship with the attorney.' 6 Numerous courts have agreed
with this rationale.' The Goodley court also reasoned that the
commercialization of legal malpractice claims could only debase
the legal profession by encouraging unjustified suits, promoting
champerty and increasing the frequency of malpractice litigation.'
This rationale was also used in the Illinois case Christison v.
Jones,°9 discussed above," which involved a trustee in bankruptcy
who claimed that he was the owner of any malpractice action
which the bankrupt might hold."' The court, in rejecting the
assignment, noted that the bankrupt found no fault with his
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 641 n.6.
104. See id.
105. 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
106. See id. at 87.
107. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 709
F. Supp. 44, 50 n.7 (D. Conn. 1989); Jackson v. Rogers & Wells, 258 Cal. Rptr.
454, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Brocato v. Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass'n, 520
N.E.2d 1200, 1201-02 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988); Clement v. Prestwich, 448 N.E.2d 1039,
1041-42 (II1. App. Ct. 1983); Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983).
108. 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
109. 405 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
110. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
111. See Christison, 405 N.E.2d at 8.
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attorney's work and did not desire to bring suit."2 Thus, allowing
an assignment would have created litigation initiated by parties
other than those directly affected.
d. Risk of Collusion. In Coffey v. Jefferson County Board of
Education,3 the court expressed concern that a client and
potential assignee might enter into a collusive agreement whereby
the client would admit liability or agree to settle in exchange for
the assignment of a malpractice action to satisfy the judgment."'
In Coffey, a defendant in a negligence suit confessed a judgment of
$1 million and tried to assign all malpractice claims against his
attorneys to the plaintiff on the day of the trial."5 The court
refused to allow this assignment, holding that the arrangement
seemed to be so collusive that it violated public policy."6
As noted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Picadilly, Inc. v.
Raikos, 7 the risk of collusion may be particularly great when the
client is judgment-proof. According to the court, the defendant's
attorneys would be the only possible source of recovery for the
plaintiff; "[i]f assignments were permitted, we suspect that they
would become an important bargaining chip in the negotiation of
settlements - particularly for clients without a deep pocket.""'
e. Restriction of the Availability of Legal Services. The threat
of assignment may also cause lawyers to decline to represent
judgment-proof defendants because often the only way the
plaintiff could recover would be to bring suit, as the defendant's
assignee, against the defendant's lawyer for malpractice. The case
of Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon" provides an example of an
assignment that was used as "a transparent device to replace a
judgment-proof, uninsured defendant with a solvent defendant,"' 20
namely the attorney. In Zuniga, the plaintiffs brought a personal
injury action against Bauer Manufacturing Company ("Bauer").'
Bauer's insurer had become insolvent and Bauer feared that a
large judgment against it would bankrupt the company." Zunigas'
lawyers offered to settle with Bauer for a $25 million judgment and
112. See id. at 11.
113. 756 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
114. See id. at 156-57.
115. See id. at 156.
116. See id. at 157.
117. 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991).
118. hL at 343.
119. 878 S.W.2d 313,317 (Tex. App. 1994).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 314.
122. See id.
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an assignment of Bauer's malpractice action against its attorneys.2
The Zunigas never intended to collect the judgment from Bauer;
instead they agreed that Bauer could transfer all its assets but the
malpractice claim to a new company, against which the Zunigas
would not assert a claim. 4 Thus the entire liability would be borne
by the attorneys defending the malpractice action.12
The Zuniga court rejected the assignment of the malpractice
claim as a "transparent device" to substitute the defendant's attor-
neys for the defendant company, which might not have been able
to absorb the liability!a  The court concluded that, "in time, it
would become increasingly risky to represent the underinsured,
judgment-proof defendant," and that any goals served by assign-
ment would not justify the detrimental impact such an assignment
would have on the legal system."'
An assignment may also restrict the availability of legal serv-
ices by increasing the cost to the potential assignee of a legal mal-
practice claim. For example, in the Juneau Factors case, once the
settlement offer was made and the assignment of the malpractice
claim against Hughes Thorsness was proposed, Hughes Thorsness
had the duty to advise its client to seek outside counsel to evaluate
the attractiveness of any settlement that included an assignment of
rights against themselves." Review of the settlement by another
attorney not only delays the settlement negotiation, but also im-
poses an extra cost on the parties attempting to kettle the case.
The cost of hiring an attorney to become familiar with both the
primary case and the potential malpractice action would likely be
substantial. If the assignment of legal malpractice claims as a part
of settlement becomes accepted and routine, the additional cost
necessary to deal with potential assignments may restrict the num-
ber of clients able to use the court system for the resolution of
their disputes.
f. Potential for Illogical Arguments Asserted by Assignee.
The court in Jackson v. Rogers & Wells 29 explained that a
malpractice suit brought against an attorney by a former adversary
is "fraught with illogic."' In the initial lawsuit, the adversary
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 317.
127. Id.
128. See Letter from Thomas G. Nave, attorney, Juneau, Alaska, to Jennifer
McDannell, Editor-in-Chief, Alaska Law Review (Jan. 4, 1996) (on file with
author).
129. 258 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
130. Id. at 461.
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argued that she was entitled to recover from the client; in the
malpractice lawsuit, she must argue that, but for the attorney's
negligence, she was not entitled to recover.13' Such an argument,
while logically consistent, may run afoul of jurors' common sense
and cause them to lose faith in the court system.
The underlying suit in Jackson was brought by Jackson against
attorney Ronald Mix and others for legal malpractice and securi-
ties fraud.1 2 Mix's malpractice carriers retained Rogers & Wells to
defend Mix." On the advice of Rogers & Wells, Mix rejected sev-
eral settlement offers by the plaintiff Jackson ranging from
$415,000 to $700,000 and proceeded to trial where the plaintiff re-
covered more that $1 million."' Jackson filed a bad faith cause of
action against Rogers & Wells and Mix's insurance carriers.'35 The
assignment at issue occurred when Jackson settled with the insur-
ance carriers and the insurance carriers assigned to Jackson any
malpractice claim they might have against Rogers & Wells, the at-
torneys they hired to represent Mix 36 The court, in rejecting the
assignment, explained how Jackson's position in the suit against
Rogers & Wells would be illogical:
By claiming as an assignee of the carriers that the attorney de-
fendants should have settled his action against Mix earlier, he in
effect claims that his own recovery by means of judgment after
court trial should have been diminished in the amount by which
it exceeds those settlement offers which allegedly should have
been accepted. M
The court refused to let Jackson recover damages, plus his own
judgment, for the alleged malpractice that allowed him to win that
judgment.38
g. Deterrence of Zealous Advocacy and the Duty of Loyalty.
Some courts reason that the attorney's duties of loyalty and
zealous advocacy may be compromised by the threat of
assignment. For example, in Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos,"9 Charles
Colvin recovered $225,000 when he was injured in an automobile
accident caused by a drunken patron of Picadilly's bar.'" Picadilly
filed for bankruptcy, and the assignment of Picadilly's malpractice
131. See id.
132. See id. at 455.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 461-62.
138. See id. at 462.
139. 582 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. 1991).
140. See id. at 339.
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action against its attorneys to Colvin was part of the reorganization
plan.141 The Indiana Supreme Court held the assignment invalid on
public policy grounds, citing among them the risk that the
attorney's duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy would be
impaired.'42 The court stated:
The assignment of a legal malpractice claim is perhaps most in-
compatible with the attorney's duty of loyalty. An attorney's
loyalty is likely to be weakened by the knowledge that a client
can sell off a malpractice claim, particularly if an adversary can
buy it. If an attorney is providing zealous representation to a cli-
ent, the client's adversary will likely be motivated to strike back
at the attorney in any permissible fashion. If an adversary can
retaliate by buying up a client's malpractice action, attorneys will
begin to rethink the wisdom of zealous advocacy. 3 w
The court concluded that assignments should not be allowed be-
cause they would discourae loyalty to the client and therefore be
a disservice to that 
client. 1
2. Arguments in Favor of Assignment. The following
jurisdictions have allowed assignment of legal malpractice claims:
the District of Columbia,45 Maine,1 6 New York, '47 Oregon,'
Pennsylvania 49 and Utah.5 Most of these jurisdictions either
reject the public policy concerns of the jurisdictions not allowing
assignments,' or base their holdings on the public policy concerns
of efficiency, lack of an attorney-client relationship, and general
equity principles. 5
a. Efficiency. At least one court has found that efficiency in
prosecuting attorney malpractice is a public policy concern
sufficiently important to justify the assignment of such claims. In
141. See id.
142 See id. at 342.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353,359 (D. D.C. 1996).
146. See Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989).
147. See Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); American Hemisphere Marine Agencies, Inc. v. Kreis, 244 N.Y.S.2d 602,
603 (N.Y. 1963).
148. See Collins v. Fitzwater, 560 P.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Or. 1977).
149. See Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa.
1988); Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
150. See Tanasse v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351,356 (Utah 1996) (involuntary transfer).
151. See, e.g., Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F.Supp. 353,357 (D.D.C. 1996).
152. See, e.g., Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989);
Hedlund Mfg. Co., 539 A.2d at 359; Collins, 560 P.2d at 1078.
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Thurston v. Continental Casualty Co.,."' a products liability action
was brought against 3K Kamper Ko. 4 Alleged inadequate legal
representation and misconduct by its insurance carrier caused 3K
to suffer judgment in excess of its policy limits.' Because 3K
could not pay the judgment, it assigned its malpractice claim to the
victorious products liability plaintiff."5 6 The court allowed the
assignment, stating that a client should be able to "realiz[e] the
value of its malpractice claim in what may be the most efficient
way possible, namely, its assignment to someone else with a clear
interest in the claim who also has the time, energy and resources to
bring the suit.""
b. Lack of Attorney-Client Relationship. Another court
concluded that relying on the attorney-client relationship to
prohibit assignment of legal malpractice actions is misplaced.
Hedlund Manufacturing Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak5" involved
the assignment of a legal malpractice action for failure to file
timely a patent application to a purchaser of the client's business."9
The court noted the long-standing rule in Pennsylvania that
permits causes of action to be assigned,"6 and held that legal
malpractice actions do not warrant a public policy exception.1 '
The court, apparently responding to arguments by courts in other
states that the public policy interest in the sanctity of the attorney-
client relationship should bar an assignment, found that the
attorney-client relationship should not be used "as a shield by an
attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of legal
malpractice." ' The court reasoned that "[w]here the attorney has
caused harm to his or her client, there is no relationship that
remains to be protected."'63
c. General Principles of Equity. In Collins v. Fitzwater,'6" an
attorney made an error in drafting promissory notes that were
issued by a corporation to various purchasers and that resulted in a
judgment being entered against the corporation and its board of
153. 567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989).
154. See id. at 923.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988).
159. See id. at 358.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 359.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 560 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Or. 1977).
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directors.'65 One member of the board of directors assigned his
cause of action against the attorney to the note-holders in
exchange for covenants not to execute upon the judgment
obtained.'66 The court allowed the assignment, noting that
laypersons who must act as corporate directors rely on attorneys as
a matter of necessity. 167 The court explained that public policy
recognizes that the layperson should not have to assume the
burden of the attorney's error when it allows a legal malpractice
suit to be brought against the attorney.'6' Similarly, the court
reasoned, an assignment of the cause of action should also be
allowed.1
69
B. Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
issue of whether a legal malpractice claim should be assignable.
Thus, an examination of the statements of lower courts and cases
in related contexts is necessary to reveal the public policy concerns
that might influence the Supreme Court on the issue of assignabil-
ity.
The closest that any Alaska court has come to discussing the
policies involved in an assignment of a legal malpractice claim oc-
curred in the Juneau Factors case itself. The superior court judge
denied Hughes Thorsness's motion for summary judgment, re-
jecting the law firm's argument that public policy prohibits the as-
signment of legal malpractice claims. 7 The judge stated his belief
that the Alaska Supreme Court would allow assignment of a legal
malpractice claim:
I believe the Supreme Court has given indications in Deal v.
Kearney and Bohna that the idea of providing resources for
prosecution in malpractice claims is something that they believe
is worthy and the idea of not creating special classes of protected
persons that are lawyers is worthy....
An examination of the cases referred to by the superior court
reveals that Alaska courts may be sympathetic toward the public
policy concerns expressed by states on both sides of the issue.
165. See id. at 1075-76.
166. See id. at 1076.
167. See id. at 1078.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Juneau Factors, Inc.
v. Hughes Thorsness Gantz Powell & Brundlin, No. 1JU-92-1799 CI (Alaska Su-
per. Ct. Nov. 22, 1993).
171. Transcription of Judge's Oral Decision on the Record at 1, Juneau Fac-
tors, No. 1JU-92-1799 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Nov. 12,1993).
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Whether these policy concerns, or those relied on by the majority
of states to disallow assignment, are applicable in the Juneau Fac-
tors case will be discussed in Part VI.
1. Deal v. Kearney: Assignment of Medical Malpractice
Claims. Public policy did not bar the assignment of a professional
malpractice claim against a doctor in Deal v. Kearney. 12 In Deal,
Kearney brought suit against the administrator of the hospital
where he was treated for a life-threatening injury, claiming
negligence on the part of Dr. Deal, one of the treating physicians.
Kearney settled with the hospital administrator. Included in the
settlement was an assignment of the administrator's claims for
indemnity, equitable subrogation and contribution against Dr.
Deal.' 4 In holding that such an assignment did not violate public
policy,75 the Alaska Supreme Court stated that the assignment was
not subject to the general rule of non-assignability of personal
injury claims because the assigned claims of indemnity, equitable
subrogation and contribution, whether characterized as contract or
tort claims, did not constitute "personal injury" to the hospital. 6
The court also found it critical that while Kearney was not directly
injured with respect to the assigned claims, he was not a stranger to
the litigation."I The principles enunciated in Deal v. Kearney may be applied
to the legal malpractice context to allow assignment when no per-
sonal injury is involved and the assignee is not a stranger to the
litigation. It is clear from Croxton that there exists in Alaska a
public policy against trafficking in lawsuits for pain and suffering.17
This public policy is not typically implicated in a legal malpractice
claim. Like the medical malpractice claim at issue in Deal, which
did not involve pain and suffering, a legal malpractice claim,
whether characterized as a tort or contract claim, usually does not
constitute "personal injury" to a client for which the client can
seek damages for pain and suffering. While the relationship be-tween attorney and cient mayr be highly personal, typically, the ac-
tual injury is pecuniary only.' Thus, the valid public policy against
unscrupulous strangers taking advantage of victims' pain and suf-
172. 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993).
173. See id. at 1354.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1356.
176. See id. at 1355-56.
177. See id. at 1356.
178. See Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1988)
(quoting Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 498 (Ariz. App. 1966)
(citing Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. 566 (1861))).
• 179. See id.
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fering is not applicable and should not bar assignment of a legal
malpractice claim, particularly when the assignee is somehow con-
nected to the litigation as in Deal. To avoid the distasteful infer-
ence of protectionism that would ensue through the creation of a
protected class of lawyers, Alaska courts must address each pro-
posed assignment to see whether valid public policy concerns are
threatened.
2. Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin:
Voluntary Assignment of the Proceeds of Legal Malpractice Claims.
The Alaska Supreme Court allowed assignment of the proceeds of
a legal malpractice claim in the context of a loan receipt agreement
("LRA") in Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell &
Brundin.'O The assignment in Bohna arose out of a settlement
between Allstate Insurance Company and its insured, Bohna.
Bohna sued Allstate and Hughes Thorsness for negligence, breach
of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a result of Hughes Thorsness's defense of Bokna in an
automobile accident case.'1 Allstate settled with Bohna by paying
$1 million and loaning him an additional $3 million to be repaid
from any recovery Bohna was able to extract from Hughes
Thorsness.1" Bohna also agreed not to dismiss his suit against
Hughes Thorsness without Allstate's consent." The Alaska
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the LRA constituted
an impermissible assignment of a malpractice claim, stating that, at
most, the agreement was a partial assignment of the proceeds of
the malpractice claim."'
The Bohna court also noted that LRAs had long been utilized
as a device to allow an insurance company to compensate injured
insureds while preserving its rights against potentially liable third
parties.185 The court upheld the use of LRAs as a settlement device
and expressly agreed with other jurisdictions that allow such as-
signments."' The Bohna decision therefore demonstrates that the
Alaska Supreme Court is receptive to arguments that promote the
efficient vindication of rights through litigation. However, the
court did not extend its reasoning to include the assignment of the
180. 828 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1992).
181. See id at 751.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 757.
185. See id. at 755.
186. See id. at 758 (citing Weston v. Dowty, 414 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987); First Nat'l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 698 P.2d 5, 14 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1985)).
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causes of action themselves. An argument for just such an exten-
sion was made by the plaintiff in Juneau Factors v. Hughes,
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin in its brief in opposition to
defendant's motion for summary judgment.' The superior court
denied summary judgment without an opinion,"s leaving the status
of this argument unresolved.
3. Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick: Involuntary Assignment of Legal
Malpractice Claims. In a case not mentioned by the superior court
in Juneau Factors, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska
found that no public policy concerns barred the involuntary
transfer of a legal malpractice claim, again suggesting that the
prosecution of legal malpractice claims is an important public
policy. In Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, "' the court concluded that
under Alaska law, a judgment debtor's potential cause of action
against its law firm was subject to involuntary transfer by way of an
execution sale.' Unlike other courts, the Bergen court did not
express concern that involuntary transfers were problematic
because they either forced clients to waive their attorney-client
privilege or forced attorneys to defend while constrained by the
attorney-client privilege.' This lack of concern for the attorney-
client privilege in the involuntary assignment context suggests that
the privilege may not be a bar to voluntary assignments, and that
Alaska law instead prefers the policy of efficient prosecution of
legal malpractice actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Would the Alaska Supreme Court have allowed the assign-
ments of legal malpractice claims at issue in Juneau Factors? As
discussed above, the Juneau Factors case involved two separate as-
signments:92 (1) the first assignment occurred when the Spaulding
Beach Condominium Association assigned any legal malpractice
187. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment/Motion to Amend at 6-7, Juneau Factors v. Hughes,
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, No. 1JU-92-1799 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st
Judicial Dist. filed Sept. 30, 1992).
188. See Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Juneau Factors, No.
1JU-92-1799 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist. Nov. 22, 1993).
189. 686 F. Supp. 786 (D. Alaska 1988).
190. See id. at 788.
191. Cf. Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 640-41 (Ct.
App. 1990).
192 See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: In-
validity of Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claim, Ex. D, Juneau Factors (No.
1JU-92-1799 CI); Id., Ex. F at 1.
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claim it may have had against Hughes Thorsness to the defendant,
Joint Ventures;193 and (2) the second assignment occurred when
Joint Ventures, now owners of any malpractice claim against
Hughes Thorsness, assigned its potential cause of action to Juneau
Factors.'9' Balancing the public policy factors involved in each as-
signment suggests that the Alaska Supreme Court would not allow
either of these assignments.
The first assignment from the Association to its adversary is
perhaps one of the most distasteful types of assignment, implicat-
ing many of the policy concerns that counsel against assignment.
Perhaps the most obvious policy concern implicated is the illogical
argument Joint Ventures would have to make to succeed in the
malpractice action against Hughes Thorsness. Joint Ventures
would have to argue that it should have been required to pay the
$415,000 it originally offered to settle the defective construction
suit. It would need to explain that it only had the opportunity to
lower its settlement offer by $225,000 due to the plaintiff attorney's
negligence. Then Joint Ventures would have to convince the jury
that having saved $225,000 on the price of settlement, it should re-
cover an additional $225,000 for the "lost settlement opportunity"
that was really borne by the Association, not Joint Ventures.
Risk of collusion between the Association and Joint Ventures
also is a significant concern. Once the trial court granted Joint
Ventures's summary judgment motion and the $415,000 offer to
the Association was withdrawn, the Association was placed in the
position of trying to maximize the next settlement offer. Since its
case had been weakened by the trial court's ruling, the only bar-
gaining chip it may have had left was the malpractice claim against
its attorney. Thus, collusion was a significant risk.
Furthermore, a careful application of Deal v. Kearney9. re-
veals that this first assignment should not be allowed. In Deal, the
court found that the assignment did not violate public policy
against champerty and maintenance because the patient-assignee
could not be considered an injured party with respect to the ad-
ministrator's claims for indemnity, equitable subrogation and con-
tribution and because he was no stranger to the relationship be-
tween the hospital and the doctor.'96 He was, in fact, a beneficiary
of that relationship as a patient of the hospital. While the assignee
of the first assignment, Joint Ventures, cannot be said to be an in-
jured party with respect to the malpractice claim against Hughes
Thorsness, it is not only on this rule of non-assignability of per-
193. See id., Ex. D.
194. See id., Ex. F at 1.
195. 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993).
196. See id. at 1355.
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sonal injury claims that Deal rests. Of great importance is the fact
that the patient was involved in and related to the litigation be-
tween the hospital and doctor, and thus an assignment to him
would not be offensive. An assignment to Joint Ventures would be
offensive because it is a stranger to the relationship between the
Association and Hughes Thorsness. In fact, it is adversarial to that
relationship. It is likely that the Alaska Supreme Court, in care-
fully applying Deal, would have recognized that the assignment to
Joint Ventures violates the intent of that case, and should not be
allowed.
It is true that the assignment did serve as a useful settlement
tool. It may have allowed the Association to maximize its recovery
in the defective construction lawsuit and efficiently maximize the
value of its cause of action against its attorney. Bohna and Bergen
both suggest that Alaska law values mechanisms that allow persons
to realize the value of their malpractice actions. However, in both
of those cases, the supreme court supported maximizing the value
of legal malpractice actions which were either imminent' 9' or al-
ready filed."' No case against Hughes Thorsness was imminent at
the time of the assignment to Joint Ventures. Thus, this assign-
ment may have truly allowed an adversary to supplant the will of
the client and create a malpractice action when none would have
otherwise been filed. The Alaska Supreme Court may refuse to
extend the reasoning of Bohna and Bergen to allow the effective
creation of a legal malpractice cause of action.
The second assignment from Joint Ventures to the newly cre-
ated Juneau Factors implicates all the policies noted above and
seems to involve the very evil that the leading case on the assign-
ment of legal malpractice claims, Goodley v. Wank and Wank, 99
feared. Juneau Factors was created to purchase and collect upon
causes of action or "factoring" causes of action." Goodley coun-
seled against "[t]he lucrative business of factoring malpractice
claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits against mem-
bers of the legal profession [and] generate an increase in legal
malpractice litigation."' ' While such a corporation may be effi-
197. See Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 686 F. Supp. 786,787 (D. Alaska 1988).
198. See Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 828 P.2d 745,
748 (Alaska 1992).
199. 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1976).
200. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Re: In-
validity of Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claim, Ex. G at 5, Juneau Factors
(No. 1JU-92-1799 CI) (containing settlement agreement in Spaulding Beach
Ass'n. v. Jan Van Dort, No. 1JU-87-678 CI (Alaska Super. Ct., 1st Judicial Dist.
filed Mar. 16, 1988)).
201. Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
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cient at prosecuting malpractice causes of action, it may create
more lawsuits than are justified.
While a per se rule against or in favor of the assignment of le-
gal malpractice claims has simplistic appeal, the Alaska Supreme
Court should not make, and likely will not be tempted to make,
such a pronouncement when it has the opportunity to consider the
issue. The policy considerations are mixed and will exist in differ-
ent proportions depending on the assignment before the court.
The most sensible approach, and the one supported by the case law
in Alaska, is a careful case-by-case analysis.
Jennifer K. McDannell
